



# **ANCIENT HISTORY**

## **ATAR course examination 2021**

### **Marking key for Greece**

Marking keys are an explicit statement about what the examining panel expect of candidates when they respond to particular examination items. They help ensure a consistent interpretation of the criteria that guide the awarding of marks.

## Section One: Short answer – Unit 3

25% (24 Marks)

## Athens 481–440 BC

## Question 15

(6 marks)

Explain the political concept of ostracism, and give an example to demonstrate its use.

Description	Marks
Explains clearly and accurately the political concept of ostracism.	4
Explains the political concept of ostracism in some detail.	3
Makes some statements about the political concept of ostracism.	2
Makes limited statements about the political concept of ostracism. May include errors.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>4</b>
Provides a relevant example and explains this relevance.	2
Lists a relevant example but does not demonstrate relevance.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>

Answers should consider how ostracism functioned in the political system. Candidates do not need to use more than one example to demonstrate its use.

Ostracism takes its name from the broken pieces of pottery used to cast votes (*Ostraka*). As a political concept ostracism:

- existed to remove individuals who were a threat to the demos
- gave citizens the ability to protect themselves against tyranny and may have been introduced by Cleisthenes
- was also later used by influential individuals to remove rivals. In this regard use of ostracism did facilitate some direction and uniformity in policy at times.

Ostracism was a powerful democratic tool and became more frequent in its use to protect the demos. However, powerful exiled citizens could return in safety without further punishment e.g. Cimon returned from exile and reoccupied his position as one of the most powerful men in Athens, so exile did not preclude involvement in further office or public/political life. Because a successful return was possible (sometimes before the ten years was up) – exiles did not tend to build up opposition in exile, so ostracism did not necessarily foment vengeful responses from the exiled. Nonetheless, the threat of ostracism effectively shaped the behaviour of influential figures who sought to avoid it.

Candidates may describe the process of ostracism as a way to demonstrate its political nature: Ostracism allowed the people to exile for ten years any Athenian who was perceived to have become too powerful. At a fixed time every year, an assembly was held at the Pnyx and votes were cast. A quorum of 6000 citizens had to be present for a vote to be taken. The individual who received the majority of votes would be exiled. The family of the exiled could stay in Athens and their property was not affected.

Examples: Xanthippus, Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Alcibiades, Thucydides. Other examples are permissible.

## Question 16

(6 marks)

Describe the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians.

Description	Marks
Describes accurately and clearly the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians.	6
Describes mostly accurately the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians.	5
Describes the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians to some extent.	4
Describes some aspects of the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians. May be generalised.	3
Identifies and/or describes limited aspects of the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians.	2
Makes minimal identification of the consequences of the Battle of Thermopylae for the members of the Hellenic League and the Persians. May include errors.	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>

Note: a selection of points from the following would be relevant in a good answer:

#### The Greeks

- Leonidas' stand at Thermopylae after sending away nearly all of his troops had a number of consequences; the majority of Greek troops were saved from the pursuing Persian forces; Pausanias becoming regent for the young son of Leonidas, leading to leadership difficulties later in the Hellenic League for Sparta; the subsequent disagreement over strategy.
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- despite the storms that wracked the Persian fleet for at least three days, destroying (according to Herodotus) 400 or more ships.
- Some of the fleet had put in at Artemisium so Athens could be evacuated. The Athenians were ready to leave if the decision went against their desire to defend Salamis.
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- Debate followed among Greeks about strategy; Salamis or the Isthmus?
- Themistocles is credited for persuading (threatening?) Eurybiades to use the Hellenic forces to defend Salamis since the landscape there advantaged the Greek fleet (though it was also probably a better strategy). The success of both Themistocles and the Athenian fleet after this point is the beginning the shift in power among the Greek allies toward Athenian leadership. However, candidates should be careful not to be distracted by a discussion of Salamis itself which is not the focus of the question
- Some candidates may mention the Decree of Troezen (the so-called Decree of Themistocles) which indicated that both Thermopylae and Artemisium were little more than delaying operations allowing opportunity for the Athenians to evacuate and for the fleet to muster. This decree may shed light on the subsequent evacuation of Athens and Leonidas' goal in holding Thermopylae. If authentic, this decree means the evacuation of Athens was planned before Thermopylae.
- If the Themistocles Decree is authentic, Athens may well have anticipated a naval battle at Salamis.

**Question 16** (continued)

## Persia

- Thermopylae was in line with the strategy devised at the meetings of the Hellenic League. Fighting in confined spaces allowed the smaller Greek forces success against the Persian military because it rendered the Persian advantage of greater numbers useless. Thus, the Persian losses were much heavier than either side might have reasonably expected at Thermopylae
- After Thermopylae fell the whole of central Greece lay open. However, the ensuing storms wreaked havoc with Persian progress and allowed the Greeks to retreat and regroup
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- Evans suggests that the campaign at Thermopylae might have been designed to checkmate Xerxes, to hold him at the pass while his supplies ran out, which may have been possible because the attack began in late August, when there was not a lot of campaign season left. Certainly, the Persian response after Thermopylae may have been cut short by the approaching end of the campaigning season.

## Question 17

(6 marks)

Outline the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League.

Description	Marks
Outlines accurately and clearly the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League.	6
Outlines mostly accurately the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League.	5
Outlines the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League to some extent.	4
Outlines some aspects of the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League. May be generalised.	3
Identifies and/or describes limited aspects of the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League.	2
Makes minimal identification of the role and importance of Aristides during the period of the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League. May include errors.	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>
<p>Candidates should be able to give specific examples of Aristides' role in this turbulent period in Athenian history. A good response will be able to develop clear links between Aristides' roles/importance.</p> <p>Aristides had a long-standing reputation for honesty. Candidates may be aware that he:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (may have) worked with Cleisthenes</li> <li>• was selected to guard and distribute the spoils after Marathon</li> <li>• had been Archon</li> <li>• was opposed to Themistocles' naval strategy in the 480s</li> <li>• was exiled for a short time before the Persian wars but returned to contribute greatly to the Athenian war effort.</li> </ul> <p>Aristides was one of the key Athenian commanders at Salamis and Plataea, thus his good reputation grew. In this case it is perhaps not surprising that he was a central figure in rebuilding Athens after the Persian War and the establishment of the Delian League. Following the Persian War, he seems to have supported democracy because of the bravery shown by the Athenian Citizens. (Plut.22).</p> <p>Aristides served with Cimon in the ongoing war against the Persians after Mycale, being credited by Plutarch (23) as being the Athenian general promoting warm behaviour toward the allies when Pausanias was being 'overbearing'. Though a background figure in the narrative at this time, Aristides' involvement at this critically important stage in Athens' establishment and leadership of the League is noteworthy. The generals of Chios, Samos and Lesbos (key Athenian allies thereafter) apparently approached Aristides and 'pressed him to accept supreme command' (Plut.23), which he refused until all of the allies had an opportunity to 'change their allegiance'. Apparently, he 'eased the Spartans out' of the leadership of the Hellenic League through 'diplomacy and tact' (Plut.23).</p> <p>Once the Spartans 'voluntarily' stood aside their leadership of the ongoing campaigns against Persia, Aristides was given the task of assessing allied contributions to the war. This was (allegedly) at the request of the allies because of his honest/reliable nature and integrity.</p> <p>Aristides organised for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 460 talents to be collected from the allies</li> <li>• Regular phoros/ships were organised and/or collected by Athenian Hellenotomiae under his guidance</li> </ul>	

**Question 17** (continued)

- He organised the Oath taken between the Athenians and the Allies and oversaw the 'wedges of red-hot iron' being thrown into the sea to seal the relationship (plut.25).

Importance: It is clear Aristides earned his good reputation. While this reputation may have been justified, it undeniably led to his having significant political influence. This influence is discernible in the steps taken to design the power structures and systems of the Delian League. While the inequity between Athens' power in the league, compared to the influence exerted by the rest of the allies, was perhaps unintentional, Aristides' control over Athens' role in these processes to some extent explains the early dominance of Athens among the Delian League allies.

## Question 18

(6 marks)

Describe the importance of **two** alliances that helped Athens to gain a Land Empire.

Description	Marks
For each of the two alliances	
Describes accurately the importance of an alliance that helped Athens to gain a Land Empire.	3
Describes some aspects of the importance of an alliance that helped Athens to gain a Land Empire.	2
Makes limited statement about the importance of an alliance that helped Athens to gain a Land Empire. May include errors	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>
<p>Good answers will present an accurate recount of the historical narrative, and, be able to link the alliances chosen for discussion with an explanation of the significance of each.</p> <p>The syllabus makes specific reference to Athens' alliances with Megara, Argos and Thessaly (described by Thuc.). In a good response, the alliances referred to in the syllabus should be discussed with the following three points in mind. All of these diplomatic initiatives secured Athenian access to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>land routes</li> <li>resources that encouraged the development of a 'Land Empire'</li> <li>they also undermined Athens' relationship with Sparta and therefore assisted in weakening one of the key discouragements that had prevented the extension of Athenian power on the mainland.</li> </ul> <p>Argos:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Traditionally hostile to Sparta, Argos allied with Athens soon after the return of the Athenian forces from Ithome.</li> <li>The Argive alliance gave Athens access to the famed hoplite forces of that polis — a useful addition to the Athenians' own infantry resources.</li> <li>Thanks to its location, Argos served as a useful buffer for Athens against Sparta, a fact that made it easier for Athens to pursue an expansionist policy in central Greece with less threat of Spartan reprisals.</li> </ul> <p>Megara:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 460 Megara allied itself with Athens on account of a frontier dispute with Corinth; Megara received an Athenian garrison, and Athens helped in the construction of Long Walls to link Megara with its port, Nisaea.</li> <li>To the extent that the alliance with Megara was a direct affront to Sparta's ally, Corinth, this initiative further signalled the breakdown of relations between Athens and Sparta, and encouraged Athens to pursue its independent aims in central Greece.</li> <li>The position of Megara helped to secure Athens against the threat of any armed invasions from Sparta.</li> </ul> <p>Thessaly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This alliance gave Athens access to the famed Thessalian cavalry, thus strengthening Athens' capacity to wage land battles successfully. By providing Athens with a sympathetic ally in central Greece, Thessaly served as something of a counterbalance to the power of Boeotia (which was strongly allied to the Spartans). Thanks to Thessaly, Athens could venture to expand her power in central Greece with a greater chance of success.</li> </ul>	

Question 19

(6 marks)

Identify **two** methods by which Athens controlled its Delian League allies and explain how these methods indicate Athens’ imperialism.

Description	Marks
For each of the two methods	
Identifies accurately and explains clearly a method by which Athens controlled her Delian League allies and explains clearly how these methods indicate Athens’ imperialism	3
Identifies and explains some aspects of a method by which Athens controlled her Delian League allies and, briefly explains briefly how these methods indicate Athens’ imperialism. May be generalised.	2
Makes a minimal identification of a method by which Athens controlled her Delian League allies and limited explanation of how this method indicates Athens’ imperialism.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	
<b>Total</b>	
<b>3</b>	
<b>6</b>	
<p>Over the years Athens took action to transform the Delian League into an Athenian Empire – candidates should be able to identify two methods by which this was achieved clearly, and, use evidence from the narrative and/or the ancient/modern sources to support their ideas. Good answers should be able to explain how Athens’ behaviour demonstrates increased domination of her allies in the league, and will include examples. Candidates may refer to Pericles’ warning (Thuc. 2.63) <i>‘Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.’</i></p> <p>Any two of the following methods could be chosen:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the economic autonomy of the allied states was limited, and Athens was able to restrict and direct movement and communication in the region, both of which made her very powerful e.g. Athens was able impose economic controls, effectively using the fleet in a number of ways such as: control over corn shipping; forced the use of Athenian coins, weights and measure; allied territory was confiscated.</li> <li>• Athenian judicial control stripped the allies of their capacity for autonomy, i.e. Athens imposed rules that Athenian courts be used to try some cases, and restricted Athenian citizenship to those whose parents were both Athenian.</li> <li>• Cultural and military control over the allies was very effective in shaping pro-Athenian policy in allied states e.g. Athens posted Athenian magistrates, governors and supervisors in a majority of cities throughout the empire; garrisons were installed supported by the fleet.</li> <li>• Forcing cultural adherence to the Athenian Calendar indicates Athens’ power to oversee and dictate daily life in allied states. (i.e. the Panathenaea).</li> <li>• Military control, and settling cleruchs and colonies in allied areas provided Athens with direct oversight. Athens established cleruchies and/or colonies of Athenians in the territory of some of its ‘allies’ such as Lesbos and (noteworthy for its failure) Nineways.</li> <li>• Direct political interference and cultural control was achieved through setting up democratic governments with pro-Athenian sympathies in allied states.</li> <li>• Athens passed a series of decrees that clearly demonstrate how repressive Athenian imperialism was - Phaselis Decree 458, Erythrae 453, Clearchus or Coinage Decree 449, Cleinas Decree 447, Chalcis Decree 446. These decrees illustrate the imperialism of Athens.</li> </ul>	



## Section Two: Source analysis – Unit 4

25% (20 marks)

## Athens, Sparta and the Peloponnesian War 440–404 BC

## Question 20

(10 marks)

Assess the perspective of the source on the effect on Sparta of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria.

You should draw upon your understanding of the wider context of events in the later part of the Archidamian War and refer to the source in your answer.

Description	Marks
Makes a comprehensive assessment of the perspective in the source about the effect of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria on Sparta. Shows thorough understanding of the source, makes detailed reference to the period of study.	9–10
Makes a relevant assessment of the perspective in the source about the effect of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria on Sparta Shows understanding of the source, offers some details about period of study.	7–8
Makes a simplistic or generalised assessment of some aspects of the perspective in the source about the effect of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria on Sparta. Shows generalised understanding of the source, makes generalised reference to the period of study.	5–6
Makes a limited assessment of the perspective in the source about the effect of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria on Sparta. Shows limited understanding of the source. Response may refer unequally to the period of study.	3–4
Makes superficial assessment of the perspective in the source and/or includes little or no evidence about the effect of the Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria on Sparta. Shows superficial understanding of the source, and or/ the period of study. May include errors	1–2
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>
<p>In a good answer:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Candidates should assess the perspective of the source comprehensively: that the events at Pylos were a grave shock to Sparta; that the Spartiates were not expendable, Spartan culture being what it was, Sparta could not afford to lose these men; the surrender was unexpected behaviour – Spartan surrender was unheard of; that the captives effectively became political hostages, which the extract implies was a huge windfall for Athens.</li> <li>• Candidates should therefore assess this event as a turning point in the war. However, answers should not simply recount the event, nor those that follow. The source implies that Sparta was devastated by this event, assessment of this point of view may be a central focus in a strong argument.</li> <li>• Argument can be made that Sparta was devastated, or, that despite the setback, Sparta rallied. A strong answer would likely consider the balance of the evidence, providing an interpretation that assesses the merits of all relevant supporting evidence.</li> <li>• Discussion of Athens' response to the situation is valid, but only in as much as it provides support to a discussion of the impact on Sparta.</li> <li>• Some candidates may argue that this is the event which led to the Peace of Nicias, others may propose that the events on Pylos are what mobilised Brasidas' campaign, which was a key component in pressuring Athens to accept peace in 421. Other interpretations are possible.</li> <li>• Evidence from ancient and/or modern sources, and from the historical narrative, may be used to support discussion in answers.</li> </ul>	

**Question 20** (continued)

Wider historical context.

The success at Pylos was probably the most important of Athens' victories in the Archidamian War. The men from the Athenian fleet, who were delayed by a storm, built a fortification on Pylos, something that (arguably) fitted with Periclean strategy. The Spartan response was to put a garrison of Spartan soldiers (including 420 hoplites, many of whom were Spartiates) on the island of Sphacteria, the plan being to prevent the Athenians anchorage by blocking the entrances to the harbour. Instead, the Athenian ships blockaded the island and cut it off, besieging the Spartans and attacking them with light armed troops. After taking heavy losses the Spartans did the unthinkable and surrendered. Candidates might consider the resultant changes to Spartan strategy (and potentially Athenian strategy, where relevant) because of the Pylos incident. The whole course of the war altered thereafter.

The argument that Sparta was negatively affected by their losses at Pylos.

- The fate of the men on the island caused great concern in Sparta. There had been a decline in Spartan manpower throughout the 5th century BC, their losses on the island were taken very seriously.
- Sparta called for an immediate armistice. They also immediately sent an embassy to Athens to negotiate a general peace which would include the Peloponnesian fleet and all the Laconian ships being handed over to Athens for the period of the armistice. This may indicate there was a group in Sparta who believed the war could not be won, certainly their strategy of invading Attica, and their operations in the north west had been unsuccessful. Thus, the hostages were a military and political Achilles heel for Sparta.
- Sparta did not consult with her allies in approaching Athens for peace at this time. Their duty to the allies was set aside against the greater need to free the hostages, which speaks to their vulnerability.
- The peace offered to Athens seems to have been based on maintaining the status quo. Athens tried to improve the terms. Sparta refused open negotiation in the assembly, Cleon seems to have taken this a sign of Spartan insincerity, leading to Athens' refusal of the peace offer. The merits of this refusal may be debated.
- The Spartans returned home and asked for the return of her fleet. Athens refused again. The armistice ended, but so did Spartan naval activity for the remainder of this phase of the war, the loss of their fleet was significant.
- Cleon's successful campaign on the island further demonstrated Spartan fallibility.
- 424 BC saw no invasion of Attica by Sparta.
- Aristophanes' *Knights* records the confidence in Athens in 424, their demands for increased allied tribute at the time support this
- Additionally, Athenian campaigns were vigorous, examples might be offered i.e. Cythera, raids along the coast of Laconia, dispossessed Aeginetans being captured and executed in the Cynurian borderland, revolt was fomented in Megara though foiled by Brasidas, Nisaea was captured, plus Demosthenes (ill-fated) attack on Boeotia.
- Spartan leadership seems to have been divided into those who sought peace and those who didn't which can be argued to have weakened their progress and response to Athens at the time.
- Sparta may have been concerned about helot revolt at the time, indeed Athens might have done well to encourage rebellion among the helots.

The argument that Sparta was not negatively affected.

Brasidas' response to the situation may be offered to support the point that although Sparta may have been immediately troubled by the loss of so many Spartiates and the ensuing hostage situation, Sparta rallied. While the loss of the hostages was significant, and perhaps more firmly established the theatre of war in the North East, the Spartan war effort can be demonstrated to have been fairly continuous:

- Despite Athens' refusal of a peace offer and the subsequent aggression of Athens (above), Sparta was already invested in a variety of ways to undermine the Athenians, though this may have been accelerated as a result of not being able to invade Attica annually (see below).
- Sparta had shown interest in the North earlier – in 426 they accepted an invitation to found a colony at Heraclea, not far from Thermopylae. Therefore, campaigns in the north east after Pylos could be interpreted as a continuation/growth of earlier interest/action.
- Revolt was occurring among the Athenian allies, allowing leverage for Spartan gain. Even as early as the armistice there was opportunity for Sparta in this regard i.e. Scione whose 'defection' from Athens was so close to the time of the armistice that Brasidas' refusal to give it up incited fury in Athens, who interpreted his announcement as defying the terms of the armistice (other examples might be offered).
- Brasidas' rescue of Megara in 424 is strong indication of Spartan recovery after the Pylos affair.
- While Brasidas may not have had the confidence of all members of Spartan leadership (Hornblower et al suggests that envy of his position and success may have limited support for him at home), he did raise an army (many of whom were Helots or mercenaries, perhaps as a result of the lack of full commitment by Spartan leadership to his enterprise) and march to the North East, heeding a call for relief from the Chalcidians initially.
- After supporting the Megarian Oligarchs, Brasidas arrived in Macedon where, after disagreeing with Perdiccas, he moved to Acanthus, modelling himself as their liberator in line with the original claim of the Spartans that they sought a 'free Greece' as their goal in the Peloponnesian War. This is strong evidence of Spartan recovery and commitment to continued aggressive policy in the war despite the hostages in Athens.
- Other Spartan successes followed (examples might be offered), and more cities joined Brasidas. Amphipolis was the tipping point for both sides, leading to the quickly redundant Peace of Nicias. However, the campaigns of Brasidas, especially the Athenian loss of Amphipolis, re-established Sparta in the overarching conflict.

## Question 21

(10 marks)

Evaluate the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae.

You should consider the source and the wider historical context of the Ionian War in your answer.

Description	Marks
Makes a comprehensive evaluation of the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae. Shows thorough understanding of the source. Makes detailed reference to the period of study.	9–10
Makes an appropriate evaluation of the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae. Shows understanding of the source, offers some detailed reference to the period of study.	7–8
Makes a generalised evaluation of the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae. Shows adequate understanding of the source, makes generalised reference to the period of study.	5–6
Makes a limited evaluation of the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae. Shows some understanding of the source, makes generalised reference to the period of study.	3–4
Makes a superficial evaluation of the validity of the statement in the source about the impact of Athens' execution of the Athenian generals who had failed to collect survivors at Arginusae. Shows little understanding of the source, makes little or no reference to the period of study. May include errors.	1–2
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>
<p>Candidates can argue that the source presents a valid point of view, or that it doesn't. Candidates should deal clearly with the point of view of the source that Athens made an error at this time. Discussion could focus on the reasons for the execution, or, may unpack the impact of the loss of the generals on Athens' progress in the war thereafter, or answers might combine these points (and/or others) as a way to evaluate the source.</p> <p>Candidates should be able to describe and assess:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• what 'serious consequences' occurred, plus the extent of their impact on Athens. Some discussion of the impact on Sparta is relevant but should not be a central point</li> <li>• whether Athens has been 'rightly censured' or not.</li> </ul>	

## Historical Context:

Athens won a number of great victories between 411–406 BC. Given the total loss of their fleet in Sicily, this represents quite an astounding recovery. Sparta was thus forced to make offers of peace, which Athens refused. However, Sparta had managed to secure Persian funding during this period of the conflict, allowing them to rebuild their fleet more than once. This proved problematic for Athens whose loss of her own fleet might result in food supplies to their besieged polis being cut.

Arginusae itself was a noteworthy victory for Athens (Diodorus), who only lost 25 of their 155 ships. Additionally, their fleet was far less splendid than their opponents', and Athens' failure to complete the rout of the Spartan forces was due only to their inability to close their left wing during the battle. Moreover, Athens' success at Arginusae contributed to renewed Spartan interest in peace. However, the battle was further out to sea than was usual, and the fleet had ended up being scattered. This made collecting survivors difficult, as did the necessity of pursuing the escaping Spartans in order to prevent their regrouping.

Thrasybulus and Theramenes were tasked with a rescue operation but were less successful than was anticipated because of a storm. Resultantly, despite their great victory, the generals from Arginusae were trialled and executed for their failure to collect the shipwrecked Athenian survivors (and their dead, according to Diodorus).

The argument that the Athenians did suffer great consequences immediately.

Candidates may point out that the narrative of Thucydides is missing for this period, thus the accounts of Diodorus and Xenophon leave us with an unclear narrative at times. However, Athens faced a number of problems after the removal of the generals, which can be argued to have been a result of the deficit created in leadership by the execution:

- Athens had generally fared well in the conflict between 410–406 BC. Thus, there is deterioration (to some extent) in their progress after the trial/execution. Candidates may recount some of these examples, but should not be distracted by a recount/retell of the events of the war, which is not required.
- Alcibiades was removed from leadership as well, resulting from the mistakes of one of his deputies. His absence is considered to have contributed to Athens' lack of experienced leadership.
- Sparta rebuilt its fleet after it had been devastated at Arginusae. The rebuild was achieved with subsidies from the Persian Cyrus whose relationship with the reappointed Lysander proved highly effective in the defeat of Athens.
- Lysander's reinstatement as (defacto) leader of the Spartan fleet resulted in efficient, decisive and aggressive Spartan strategy. They challenged Athens' control of the Hellespont, engaged in several battles, the most decisive being Aegospotomoi, which cost Athens 170 ships and led to Sparta cutting Athens' corn supply:
  - Athens' citizens were stuck inside her long walls, the resultant famine increased Athens' vulnerability, defeat followed shortly thereafter
  - Aegospotomoi was lost largely due to lack of any dynamic strategy by Athenian generals and candidates may conclude that this demonstrates the generals who remained provided a lower standard of skill/leadership. Candidates may note the rejection of Alcibiades' attempt to support the Athenian generals at Aegospotomoi and, might argue the merits of this refusal.

The argument that the Athenians did not suffer great consequences immediately.

- Athens refused a peace offer from Sparta. Candidates may argue the merits of this decision. Clearly Athens believed itself capable of a total defeat of Sparta in 406 BC. Aristotle declared this rejection of peace 'reckless' (*Constitution of the Athenians* 34.1), but the Athenians did have reason to suspect Sparta would break the terms of a peace treaty (i.e. the failure of the Peace of Nicias), moreover, Sparta was weak after Arginusae.
- Sparta could not be confident of ongoing Persian support or funding at this point. Cyrus decided to provide his own funds to Lysander, because, apparently the Persian King's money had all been spent. Thus, Spartan recovery was by no means guaranteed.
- Sparta was split by the decision to use Persian support to defeat Athens, any agreement with Persia was distasteful to many of them. Sparta was therefore not unified of purpose.
- Athens had been able to carry out a number of unopposed attacks on Sparta after Arginusae.
- Athens had a superior fleet at Samos that prevented Sparta having free movement back and forth from the Hellespont.

**Question 21** (continued)

Has Athens been 'rightly censured'?

Candidates may argue that Athens' demise after this event supports Kagan's comments. Alternatively, they may argue the opposite using evidence that Athens might have won through, both arguments might use the evidence above.

*Other points may be made.*

- The execution shocked the ancient source Xenophon, who criticises it heavily. Though, as an exile himself his account tends to be critical of Athenian democracy
- Some modern sources are equally horrified (i.e. the source, candidates may be aware that this narrative refers to it as an 'atrocious' p.466)
- A plan to rescue the men *was* enacted. The storm that rendered this operation largely unsuccessful was pure misfortune.

Alternatively:

- the common man was greatly valued by the democracy of Athens.
- Modern sources (i.e. Powell) suggest that suspicion of powerful individuals among lower class citizens was not unwarranted.
- The Athenians placed almost as great an importance in securing a proper burial for the dead as they did on rescuing the living. Therefore, the demos' disgust with the generals' failure to bring the men back should be carefully judged.
- Additionally, it was not impossible to collect survivors at Arginusae. Time was available after the battle, and before the storm hit. The decision of the generals to pursue the Spartans, while strategically understandable, undoubtedly left the survivors at risk.
- Diodorus mentions that there were later cases where generals chose to rescue the dead and stranded (c.337 BC), instead of pursuing the enemy, because 'they remembered Arginusae' (Diodorus XV 35 1.). Thus, the execution did change the behaviour of generals, which saved lives later on.

## Question 22

(10 marks)

Assess the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective in the source about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War.

You should refer to your knowledge of the period of study and the historical context of the source in your answer.

Description	Marks
Makes a comprehensive assessment of the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Shows thorough understanding of the source. Makes detailed reference to the period of study.	9–10
Makes an appropriate assessment of the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Shows understanding of the source, offers some detailed reference to the period of study.	7–8
Makes a generalised assessment of some aspects of the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Shows adequate understanding of the source, makes generalised reference to the period of study.	5–6
Makes limited assessment of the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Shows some understanding of the source, makes generalised reference to the period of study.	3–4
Makes a superficial assessment of the usefulness of Thucydides' perspective about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Shows little understanding of the source, makes little or no reference to the period of study. May include errors.	1–2
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>
<p>In a good answer, candidates:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• will clearly identify Pericles' strategy and changes to this strategy by subsequent leaders.</li> <li>• may either agree/disagree with Thucydides that Pericles' strategies were sound, as long as an argument is supported by valid evidence (this may be evidence from the narrative and/or from ancient/modern sources).</li> <li>• should be cautious of wholly accepting Thucydides' judgement that, after Pericles, the nature and decisions of the individuals in Athenian leadership put the state at risk, ultimately leading to ruin for Athens (for reasons stated in the next two dot points).</li> <li>• consider the impact that Thucydides' bias has on his perspective about Pericles' strategy. He is notoriously anti-democratic and pro-Periclean. Answers may include mention of the impact of the later demagogues (i.e. Cleon et al) on Thucydides' own life and career, but this should not be a central point.</li> <li>• will consider the retrospective nature of 2.65 itself, and the fact that Thucydides' whole account argues consistently that Athens <i>could</i> have won, if it hadn't been for inadequate subsequent leadership in Athens.</li> </ul>	

**Question 22** (continued)

Elements of Pericles' strategy:

Defensive

- Withdraw the people from Attica behind the long walls in the event of any invasion by Sparta – using the long walls to the Piraeus and the control of the fleet as a way of ensuring regular supplies to those inside the city.
- Rejection of any inducement to meet the Spartans in battle on land.
- Careful maintenance of the fleet to ensure control of the sea/allies.
- 1000 talents were set aside plus 100 ships in set in reserve.
- Control of Allies brought Athens security and much needed financial resources.
- No expansion of the empire/addition of new territory during the war (this was represented as unnecessary).

Pericles' Strategy:

Good answers will be able to give a balanced account of Pericles' strategy which goes beyond listing its features. This will allow better assessment of the merits of the strategy.

For example:

- Pericles' strategy of *Periesesthai* - to win through. Pericles aimed to conduct a (largely though not entirely) defensive war which might convince the Spartans that they could not break Athens' position. Later strategies included more of the offensive elements of his strategy, and are arguably not as vastly different to Pericles' intent as Thucydides' would have us believe.
- Pericles' strategy may also have been an acknowledgement that attempts to defeat Sparta on the battlefield were unlikely to end well, at least in part due to the greater number of Peloponnesian land forces.
- Pericles believed that Sparta would sue for peace within a few short years, accepting the power and greatness that Athens had built over several decades. (Candidates may note that events [i.e. the plague, death of Pericles] and the continuation of the war also prevented Sparta from pursuing their traditional strategy, rendering this point additionally moot).
- Good answers will acknowledge however, that Pericles likely did not anticipate the Archidamian phase of the war continuing for ten years, much less the 27 years of the whole conflict (indicated perhaps by the, ultimately, inadequate funds set aside for the conflict).

Offensive

Pericles was clear that this element of his strategy would only be offered as a means of retaliation

- Raids on Attica were met by raids on the Peloponnese.
- Invading Megara bi-annually.
- Establishment of forts in Attica would be met by similar actions in the Peloponnese.
- Cavalry raids would occur if the Spartans came too close to the Athenian walls.

Changes to strategy

A good answer would not require an exhaustive list of these changes, but, would need to demonstrate sound knowledge of key examples. Changes began to occur about two years after Pericles death. Examples include:

- 427 – Sicily (and again in 426/5). These seem to have been undertaken to assess the possibility of the conquest of Sicily.
- 426 – Central Greece. Nicias at Tanagra; Demosthenes in Aetolia.
- 425 – Nicias attacked Corinth.
- 424 – loss of Boeotia after defeat at Delium.
- 424 – An attempt to gain control over Megara.
- Events such as those at Pylos and Cythera arguably fit Pericles' initial strategy of establishing forts and garrisons in the Peloponnese.



Candidates may indicate a range of reasons for changes to have occurred:

Answers should refer to the reasons that change occurred in order to demonstrate their understanding of the wider historical context. This will support assessment of the accuracy of Thucydides' claims about the effectiveness of Pericles' strategy, and, allow arrival at a conclusion about whether or not Thucydides' judgement of Pericles' strategy and successors is valid.

- Thucydides indicates that Pericles developed and maintained Athens' initial strategy, his death provided opportunity for change.
- the plague had an important effect on Athenian morale. Pericles' decision to bring the people of Attica inside the walls was, to some extent, responsible for the extent of the infection. Thus, there was subsequent displeasure with Pericles, and his strategy.
- changes in politics:
  - Cleon was much more offensive in his approach to winning the war, the defeat of Sparta was his political goal. He became the most influential leader of the people.
  - New generals such as Demosthenes and Hippocrates were also more aggressive. They wanted to take the initiative and win the war.
  - The death of Cleon at Amphipolis led to more conservative Athenian leadership under Nicias and thus a move towards peace with Sparta.
- Military success:
  - Pylos/Sphacteria was wildly successful, and began a series of 'unPericlean' campaigns at Boeotia, Corinth, Megara, and possibly Cythera.
  - The Athenian demos became more radical and adventurous with each success. Thus, the change in strategy gained a momentum of its own.

## Section Three: Essay

50% (50 Marks)

## Part A: Unit 3

25% (25 marks)

## Athens 481–440 BC

Marking key for Questions 23 to 25.

Description	Marks
<b>Introduction</b>	
Defines the focus of the topic/question, defines key terms and provides relevant background information. Provides a proposition that articulates the direction of the essay in terms of line of argument/viewpoint.	3
States the topic/question and provides some relevant background information. Provides a simple proposition indicating direction to be taken in relation to the focus of the essay.	2
States the topic/question and provides limited background information.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Understanding of historical narrative/context</b>	
Produces a relevant, sophisticated narrative that demonstrates an understanding of the interrelationships between events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	7
Produces a relevant, comprehensive narrative that demonstrates an understanding of the relationships between events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	6
Produces a relevant, coherent narrative that demonstrates an understanding of some connections across events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	5
Produces a narrative that identifies some connections across events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change in the narrative, and/or shows some understanding of the reliability of the ancient evidence in the narrative.	4
Produces a simple narrative which is mainly chronological and makes some reference to events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or shows limited understanding of the ancient evidence.	3
Produces a simple narrative which is often incorrect and makes minimal reference to events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or demonstrates minimal understanding of the relevant ancient evidence.	2
Makes general/superficial statements about the narrative.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Argument</b>	
Constructs a sustained, logical and sophisticated argument which shows a depth of analysis in relation to the topic/question.	6
Constructs a coherent, analytical argument in relation to the topic/question.	5
Produces a logically-structured argument that shows some analytical thinking in relation to the topic/question.	4
Provides relevant points/information in relation to the topic/question and indicates direction for argument.	3
Makes generalisations and some relevant statements in relation to the topic/question.	2
Makes superficial, disjointed statements in relation to the topic/question.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Use of evidence</b>	
Uses relevant ancient sources with accuracy and detail throughout the essay. Refers to this evidence at points where it provides support for the argument/viewpoint.	6
Uses relevant ancient sources with accuracy throughout the essay. Refers to this evidence at effective points to provide some support for the argument/viewpoint.	5
Uses relevant sources in the essay. Refers to this evidence at some appropriate points.	4
Provides some relevant evidence. Refers to this evidence but with inaccuracies.	3
Provides some limited evidence with inaccuracies. Makes an attempt to refer to some of this evidence.	2
Provides minimal evidence which is often irrelevant or inaccurate.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	
Draws together the argument/viewpoint of the essay, linking evidence presented with the original proposition.	3
Summarises the argument/viewpoint of the essay, making some reference to the topic/question.	2
Makes general/superficial statements about the focus of the essay.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>

## Question 23

(25 marks)

Describe Ephialtes' and Pericles' reforms to the legal and political institutions of Athens and assess their impact on the development of radical democracy.

Candidates should be able to give a detailed description of the reforms. However, description of the reforms is only part of the requirement of the question. A good answer will develop clear links between the reforms and the development of radical democracy, and, be able to offer examples to support any links that are made. Examples may extend into Unit 4 material since the development and influence of the democracy spans the Unit 3 and 4 syllabuses. Pertinent, thoughtful, well-chosen examples of democracy in action may be used to support discussion of the emergence of the radical democracy in a stronger response.

Reforms and context:

Ephialtes/Pericles were competing with Cimon for support and power. They used democratic changes (in part) to remove Cimon as a threat. Plutarch explains that while Cimon was away in Thasos, Ephialtes and Pericles had been 'smearing' the Areopagus (and Cimon himself) in order to weaken it before moving directly against it (and Cimon).

The Areopagus had traditionally held significant power in the following areas:

- appointment and supervision of public officials
- control of city affairs
- defence of the constitution
- religious matters.

The Areopagus had considerable power through its right:

- (up to 462) to carry out the *dokimasia* (examination of suitability for office) for public officials including archons and *strategoï*.
- to supervise officials during the term of office and to conduct, if it saw fit, the *euthuna* (investigation into the lawful exercise of office) at its conclusion. This was a significant means through which the Areopagus could influence the direction and implementation of Athenian policy.

Ephialtes removed all political powers from the Areopagus and gave these to either the Boule, Ecclesia or Heliaea. Empowering the demos in this way represents a very significant change.

(Note: What is italicised below may be connected to the development of radical democracy)

- Religious powers were left with the Areopagus. (The nine Archons were elected by sortition but only from pentacosiomedimnoi and hippeis - therefore still shaping the Areopagus).
- Dokimasia for archons went to the Boule. Other officials underwent their Dokimasia in the people's court – the Heliaea. Members of the Boule were examined by the outgoing Boule.
- Ongoing supervision of officials was undertaken by the Boule for matters that were punishable by fines of 500 drachmas or less – more serious matters were dealt with by the Heliaea.
- All officials were also subjected to euthuna by new boards of the Boule – the 10 euthunoi (auditors) and 30 logistae (accountants).
- The key impact on *Athens and its people is that all officials were now regularly accountable for the actions to elected bodies* of Athenian citizens.
- The Areopagus had also had extensive *judicial powers* over the behaviour of Athenian citizens, who could be fined with no reason needed to be given for their punishment. Ephialtes' reforms made Athenians *individually responsible for bringing actions* before the Heliaea, making the process more open and democratic.

## Question 23 (continued)

- The Areopagus had also exercised the first right to consider *eisangelia* (charges of activity against the state), the process of impeachment – deciding if a prosecution was warranted to be heard by the *Heliaea* or the *Ecclesia*. This power was moved to the *Boule*. *Eisangelia* had always been a significant power, moving it to the *Boule* meant the people were now better protected against it.
- Pericles introduced *payment for Jurors making it accessible to most (the Zeugetia notably)*.
- Choosing Archons and other minor officials *was done by lot* (thereby affecting the make-up of the now isolated Areopagus)
- To protect all the benefits of democracy, Pericles also introduced a decree introducing *citizenship restrictions*.

The development of Radical Democracy:

Better candidates will consider the wider impact of democratic reforms and beliefs *on both influential and ordinary citizens, and, should consider who was excluded*.

- After the death of Ephialtes, Athenian *Democracy reached its height (was most 'radical') under Pericles*.
- This was the truest democracy known in the ancient world. *The citizens of Athens were invested in and connected directly to the government of their polis.* There are various examples which display their connection to the government – the support given to use of Delian League funds for the Building program, the Melian dialogue, the Sicilian Campaign, their use of ostracism, votes taken by the demos in regard to peace (and other) treaties in both Unit 3 and 4.
- There were *exclusions*. Candidates should note this – women/slaves/Metics/the young/the Thetes/the limits of citizenship. There was also some issue with accessibility for country dwellers.
- Universal suffrage existed for adult males who also all had the right to stand for office, some of the more prominent demagogues might be offered as an example of the outcome of this change.
- All magistrates were elected by *popular vote or by sortition*, there is no doubt *these officials were all controlled by the people*, accountability was to the demos. Many of our ancient sources are at pains to point out the weaknesses of the demos' decision-making capacity. For some in the Aristocracy including Thucydides and Cimon, some of these changes *were too radical*. Thucydides said it led to poor decisions, claiming that radical democracy (including the influence of individuals like Cleon) made failed and unwise judgments. Cimon's attempt to restore the Areopagus led to his suffering the democratic blunt instrument of ostracism, which clearly demonstrates the commitment of the demos to the new system given Cimon's status, long and stellar career up until the late 60's. The willingness of the demos to call on him later to serve them again in Egypt underscores that they would not tolerate his opposition to the new system, but valued his skills enough to reinstate him.
- Democracy was *valued by the Athenians and their city pride* and involvement in government affairs was an honour for them, and one they were keen to protect. Their response to the generals who left the survivors to perish after Arginusae might be better considered through the lense of the commitment of the demos to the common man.
- Though it is in Unit 4, comment can be made by candidates about the *Oligarchic revolt of 411 showing that an oligarchic sentiment was still evident at this time*. Thus, for some the reforms were not welcome
- The democracy *contrasted sharply with Athens' imperial behaviour, though allies who were forced to adopt democracy clearly saw benefit from it*.
- The *demos became very powerful* and the possibility of *demagoguery arose*. In this way influential individuals from across social classes could harness the power of the demos. Pericles himself has been argued to have been the greatest of the demagogues, despite his noble background. This mould shaped others i.e. Alcibiades, Demosthenes. Leaders with lower class background feature prominently in the ancient sources (i.e. Cleon).

Overall:

- After the reforms a man could serve in all parts of the government, vote on all matters in the assembly, sit on a jury, and be paid to do so. The impact of payment for office cannot be underestimated since it was the vehicle that drove fuller participation, a key tenet of democracy.
- despite the exclusions, the democratic reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles gave the demos a considerable amount of power, reduced the power of the aristocracy, engaged all citizens in running their country and also made available a popular support base that at times according to Thucydides led Athens to be susceptible to 'the whims of the multitude'.

## Question 24

(25 marks)

Describe Thucydides' representation of Pausanias, and evaluate the reasons given by Thucydides for the removal of Pausanias' and Spartan leadership of the Greeks following the Persian War 480–478 BC.

Thucydides' account (1.95 ff) is hostile to Pausanias, despite identifying Pausanias and Themistocles later as being two of the foremost individuals of the time (1.138). A good response will go beyond simple narrative of the events, and, offer some analysis of Thucydides' account some of which forms part of his *Pentecontaetia*. Thucydides' knowledge and recount of the end of Pausanias' career has been doubted and debated by the secondary sources, and stronger candidates may indicate that it is wise to be wary of accepting the account as is.

The narrative:

- 479 BC Pausanias made expeditions to Cyprus and Byzantium in order to prevent the Persians having a base for a counterattack on Greek forces. After the siege and capture of Byzantium, Thucydides tells us that Pausanias became 'arrogant' (1.95. Pausanias is alleged to have published an inscription at Delphi boasting that he alone was responsible for winning the Persian war), indicated some pro-Persian sentiment, and may also have been involved in rousing Helot revolt. The result of his overbearing attitude was twofold:
  - One; the Spartans replaced Pausanias with Dorcis, but then relinquished their Hegemony to Athens completely, (according to Thucydides') because they did not trust some Spartans to behave appropriately away from home (Leotychidas had also been problematic at the time) and
  - Two; Pausanias' command caused the alienation of the Ionian Greeks (who were probably resistant to the Spartan suggestion that they be evacuated - relocation from Ionia meant leaving their wealth and position behind [Herodotus 9.106]), with whom the Athenians had cultural ties, and who Athens wanted to assist in escaping Persian dominance.
- Thus, the Ionian allies approached Athens to lead them. Thucydides tells us the Spartans believed Athens' was 'perfectly capable' of commanding and that Sparta was glad to facilitate, 'no longer wanting to be burdened with the war against Persia' (1.95).
- Good candidates may also consider reasons outside Thucydides
- Fear of corruption of officers and on friendly terms with Athens.

Thucydides' account:

Thucydides' account of Pausanias in Book 1 forms part of his motif about Athenian power. He uses weaknesses in Spartan leadership as one of the central reasons for the wax in Athens' influence.

The *Pentecontaetia* is renowned for its questionable accuracy partly due to the superficial nature of its narrative, partly due to its construction, and partly as a result of Thucydides' using it to provide an apology, of sorts, for Athenian dominance.

This section of the History is also unusual in that it retells a 'story', something which Thucydides professes to try to avoid. This has led scholars to suggest that the account may not be accurate because it accepts Peloponnesian propaganda. In his defence, Thucydides does refer to Pausanias having enemies at home, he also did visit the Peloponnesians during his exile, and does preface his comments about Pausanias with the disclaimer '*it is said*'.

## Question 25

(25 marks)

Evaluate the significance of the contribution of the initial campaigns under Cimon to 461 BC to the development of Athenian military and political power, both internally and externally.

The syllabus lists the campaigns at Eion, Scyros, Carystus, Naxos, Eurymedon and Thasos. Candidates should be able to provide some detail about all of these events. Answers may refer to earlier incidents at Byzantium as well, which is valid. The significance of these campaigns for Athenian power will likely be the discriminating factor between stronger and weaker answers. In particular, stronger answers should engage with the question of the *nature* of Athenian power both in its internal and external expression; the syllabus directs candidates to both, and material pertinent to both external and internal power should be credited by the markers.

Candidates might note that the ancient sources do not provide clear information about much of this period of time i.e. Thucydides' *Pentecontaetia* provides little more than a list and summative judgements, thus interpretation and commentary provided by reliable secondary sources may be referred to/cited (by stronger candidates especially).

Eion:

- The initial motive was to remove the Persians under their commander, Butes, from the city.
- The surrounding country was very fertile so Cimon gave it to the Athenians, who subsequently established a colony there.
- Plutarch says, 'under Cimon, they had an opportunity to carry the war into their enemies and ravage it, and beside this they won new territory which they could colonise'.
- Also, the commercial and strategic Thraceward region was secured.

Significance:

- This campaign consolidated Athenian power internally by demonstrating their ability to lead the League forces successfully against the Persians; it also revealed how such successful campaigning opened up opportunities for Athenian profit (through colonisation of conquered territory).
- Externally, the Spartans and Persians would have become aware of Athens capacity for leadership and her clear interest in expansion.

Eurymedon:

- Treated out of sequence here, Eurymedon was another victory over the Persians, a monumental victory at that.

Significance:

- The scale of this victory saw an immense increase in Athenian prestige internally and externally. It also consolidated Athens' hegemony of the Delian League. So great was the victory that, according to some of our historical traditions, the Persian king offered terms to the Athenians in the form of the Peace of Callias (if one accepts the date for this treaty as coinciding with the event), which amounted to recognition of Athenian victory. This established Athens' preeminence in the region.
- Somewhat ironically, therefore, this victory also threatened to undermine Athenian power in the League. The allies no longer viewed the Persians as a viable threat, by extension, the League was therefore no longer necessary for their protection. Many sought to leave the League at this time, resulting in Athens tightening her control over her allies. Candidates might indicate some of these methods of control and their effect on the allies.
- Plutarch makes it clear that Eurymedon brought vast wealth to Athens.
- Use of Phoros to build ships increased Athens' military power.
- Development of overall themes i.e. empowerment of Thetes which leads to democratic reform.
- Positioning of Cimon.
- Increase in Phoros for Athens supporting the development of democracy.

## Scyros:

- The campaign targeted the Dolopian pirates.
- This campaign increased Athenian power internally, by diverting more resources into Athenian hands. (Scyros was colonised by Athenians).

## Significance:

- The expansion of League campaigns to target not only Persians but other threats to Athenian and allied interests, contributed to the expansion of Athenian power by stretching the remit of the Delian League. Over time, the Athenians would come to justify their retention of the League for the purpose of 'keeping the seas safe' – this appears as a reason for the maintenance of the League according to Plutarch and the Periclean 'Congress Decree'.
- Securing a safe passage around the Aegean would have significant benefits for the growth of Athenian economic power, which fed directly into her political control of the Aegean region, including and beyond those poleis who were her allies.

## Naxos:

- Naxos was reduced by the Delian League fleet after an attempt to secede from the League.
- Answers should outline the harsh settlement imposed on Naxos, which was essentially made her into a subject of the Athenians. Naxos' independent military power was removed through the confiscation of its fleet.

## Significance:

- This campaign had significant implications for Athenian power. It signalled that the Athenians intended to retain allies within the League, by force if necessary if those allies wanted to break away from the League. Moreover, it signalled to other allies that Athens had the capacity to enforce an ongoing relationship. The example of Naxos will have acted as something of a warning to other allies not to attempt to break from the League. This demonstrates the increase of Athens' internal influence in the League, and would have been a development of interest to the independent and Peloponnesian polities. Clearly Athens' relationship with the allies had moved into a different stage.
- The confiscation of the Naxian fleet increased Athenian power in a very tangible way, a way that was replicated throughout the history of the League. Naval resources become increasingly concentrated at Athens, to the exclusion of other *poleis*, rendering them reliant on Athens and defenceless against her. The fleet, more than any other tool, increased her standing and influence in the region.

## Thasos:

- Cimon led a campaign against Thasos when the latter attempted to revolt from the League. The dispute arose over control of trading posts and mines on the mainland adjacent to Thasos, land which Athens was attempting to assume control of. Athens' desire to establish a foothold in this region, which was additionally a good source of timber, is attested further by the answer of the local people to the attempts to establish an Athenian colony.
- The campaign ended with the suppression of Thasos' revolt after a lengthy siege. It could be argued that the length of the siege threatened to undermine Athenian power; certainly Cimon faced a backlash within Athens because of his perceived failure to prosecute this campaign in a timely manner.
- Thasos was required to demolish its walls, surrender its navy and pay an indemnity; it was required thereafter to pay *phoros* to the League.

## Significance:

- The campaign at Thasos strengthened Athens in an economic sense, Athens got control of the mines and trading post, and established a colony; the influx of *phoros* and a war indemnity should also be noted. Internal power over her subject was further facilitated.
- Thasos indicated the nature of Athens' imperialism, her willingness to go to great lengths to maintain internal control over the allies (i.e. the total subjugation of Thasos thereafter), and their willingness to attack free Greek nations who might prevent Athenian plans for expansion and control.
- It left Athens militarily/politically stronger. The fate of Thasos served as a warning to other would-be rebels. Sparta responded by [secretly] offering to invade Attica, but, was unable to do so because of problems at home. The offer from Sparta signifies their recognition of the threat of Athens' imperialism, and Athens' potential to be a threat in the region.



## Part B: Unit 4

25% (25 marks)

## Athens, Sparta and the Peloponnesian War 440–404 BC

Marking key for Questions 26–28

Description	Marks
<b>Introduction</b>	
Defines the focus of the topic/question, defines key terms and provides relevant background information. Provides a proposition that articulates the direction of the essay in terms of line of argument/viewpoint.	3
States the topic/question and provides some relevant background information. Provides a simple proposition indicating direction to be taken in relation to the focus of the essay.	2
States the topic/question and provides limited background information.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Understanding of historical narrative/context/sources</b>	
Produces a relevant, sophisticated narrative that demonstrates an understanding of the interrelationships between events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	7
Produces a relevant, comprehensive narrative that demonstrates an understanding of the relationships between events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	6
Produces a relevant, coherent narrative that demonstrates an understanding of some connections across events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or reliability of the ancient evidence.	5
Produces a narrative that identifies some connections across events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change in the narrative, and/or shows some understanding of the reliability of the ancient evidence in the narrative.	4
Produces a simple narrative which is mainly chronological and makes some reference to events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or shows limited understanding of the ancient evidence.	3
Produces a simple narrative which is often incorrect and makes minimal reference to events, people and ideas, and/or continuity and change, and/or demonstrates minimal understanding of the relevant ancient evidence.	2
Makes general/superficial statements about the narrative.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Argument</b>	
Constructs a sustained, logical and sophisticated argument which shows a depth of analysis in relation to the topic/question.	6
Constructs a coherent, analytical argument in relation to the topic/question.	5
Produces a logically-structured argument that shows some analytical thinking in relation to the topic/question.	4
Provides relevant points/information in relation to the topic/question and indicates direction for argument.	3
Makes generalisations and some relevant statements in relation to the topic/question.	2
Makes superficial, disjointed statements in relation to the topic/question.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Use of evidence</b>	
Uses relevant ancient sources with accuracy and detail throughout the essay. Refers to this evidence at points where it provides support for the argument/viewpoint.	6
Uses relevant ancient sources with accuracy throughout the essay. Refers to this evidence at effective points to provide some support for the argument/viewpoint.	5
Uses relevant sources in the essay. Refers to this evidence at some appropriate points.	4
Provides some relevant evidence. Refers to this evidence but with inaccuracies.	3
Provides some limited evidence with inaccuracies. Makes an attempt to refer to some of this evidence.	2
Provides minimal evidence which is often irrelevant or inaccurate.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Conclusion</b>	
Draws together the argument/viewpoint of the essay, linking evidence presented with the original proposition.	3
Summarises the argument/viewpoint of the essay, making some reference to the topic/question.	2
Makes general/superficial statements about the focus of the essay.	1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>

## Question 26

(25 marks)

Evaluate the extent to which Thucydides' representation of Cleon and Athens' radical democracy is reliable and/or accurate.

Answers should:

- demonstrate detailed understanding of the narrative, and of the ancient sources (in this case, including but not limited to, Thucydides – Aristophanes' account is valuable).
- be able to carry out historiographical analysis in order to explain the issues with 'reliability and accuracy' in Thucydides account, drawing upon the narrative and the sources to provide relevant and accurate evidence and examples.
- be wary of accepting Thucydides' portrayal of both Cleon and the radical democracy. Thucydides' account is biased. A good answer will be able to provide evidence that identifies numerous points of concern about this bias, how it affects the reliability *and* accuracy of Thucydides' representation, and, be able to suggest reasons for the issues with his account.
  - a strong answer will be aware of the negative source tradition regarding Cleon, and, will be able to move beyond the simplistic conclusion that the existence of other similar ancient source representations of Cleon demonstrate that Thucydides' vilification of Cleon is justified.
- show awareness of Thucydides' clear hostility towards radical democracy, and by extension towards Cleon who, for Thucydides, acts very much as an exemplar of the demagogic products of that system. Answers should note the possibility that this hostility was fuelled not only by Thucydides' admiration for the leadership of Pericles (which Thucydides would have us believe was of a different calibre to that of the demagogues), but also by Thucydides' condemnation by a democratic jury in the wake of his failures at Amphipolis.

Representation of radical democracy:

Candidates could note Thucydides' explicit condemnation at 2.63ff, where he rebukes the radical democracy for giving rise to politicians who sought power through the cultivation of popular support, and who therefore failed to consider the long-term impacts of their policies, leading, he claims, to Athens' ultimate defeat. The connection he makes between the Athenian failure at Sicily and the behaviour of the demagogues is a clear example of this, with the demos voting for an expedition on the prospect of their own immediate material gain. The fickleness of the Athenian *demos* is further touched upon by Thucydides (again the Sicilian Expedition is used to provide more material, thanks to the idiosyncratic choice of commanders, the recall of Alcibiades, and the decision to send reinforcements with Demosthenes).

Representation of Cleon:

- Some of Thucydides' characterisations of Cleon are derogatory: i.e. his condemnation of Cleon's oratorical style when he first introduces him in his *History*; his claims that Cleon was solely being brash when he claimed he could lead the campaign at Pylos to victory.
- Part of Thucydides' bias against Cleon stems from class bias. Cleon was a scion of a wealthy but mercantile family, and not from the aristocratic families (such as that of Pericles and Thucydides himself) who had traditionally dominated Athenian politics. Thucydides' sneering comments about Cleon's speaking style is based in his prejudices about aristocratic education. (Aristophanes ridicules Cleon for exactly the same thing, mocking his speaking style in various plays).
- Thucydides uses Cleon to embody the greediness of the Athenian *demos*, a greediness which translated into an insatiable desire for the expansion of Athenian territory (and thus for the wealth that would flow to the *demos* as a result).

- Thus, Thucydides portrays Cleon as a ruthless imperialist during the Mytilenian revolt of 427 BC where Cleon proposed the execution of the Mytilenians; 'It was he who had been responsible for passing the original notion for putting the Mytilenians to death. He was remarkable among the Athenians for the violence of his character and at this time he exercised the greatest influence over people' Thucydides 3.36. The narrative device of pairing a speech by Cleon with the more moderate (and successful) speech by Diodotus helps to shape the reader's negative answer to Cleon.
- Other examples Thucydides claims illustrate Cleon's ruthless imperialism include: his raising of the tribute to 1460 talents; his decree for the execution of the citizens of Scione in 423.
- However, it is important to note that Cleon's strategy with respect to Mytilene was in line with the Periclean strategy of 'holding onto the empire'.
- Thucydides does note Cleon's success at Pylos-Sphacteria in 425 BC when he captured 292 Spartiate hostages, though it is implied that this success was in some way accidental.
- Cleon is portrayed as a war monger, consistently frustrating Nicias' attempts at a peace settlement with Sparta.
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- In terms of accuracy and reliability, it may be noted that some elements of Thucydides' hostile characterisation of Cleon are also found in the portrayals by Aristophanes of this politician on the contemporary stage. This might superficially suggest that Thucydides' picture of Cleon is vindicated, but it is important to consider that Aristophanes was also motivated by personal hostility toward Cleon (there are insinuations of legal actions between the poet and the politician); Aristophanes and Thucydides are both drawing upon the same negative stereotype to undermine a politician of whom neither approves.

## Question 27

(25 marks)

Assess the extent to which the Sicilian Expeditions 415–413 BC were a turning point for the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War.

While the question identifies the Sicilian Expedition, the answer does NOT require extensive discussion of the events in Sicily. Some consideration of the course of the Sicilian campaigns may be valid, but the outcome of Athens' actions in Sicily is more relevant to answering the question effectively.

The focus of this question is the nature and extent of the immediate and longer-term consequences of the defeat for Athens internally (including the impact on her allies and the security of her empire), and how Athens' defeat at Sicily had a wider destabilising effect in terms of the re-emergence of Persian interference in the region.

Candidates should conclude that Sicily was an important factor in weakening Athens' position in the war and be able to relate evidence/examples that support this. However, a balanced view will also point out that Athens was aggressive and did make progress for some time during the period that immediately followed and in the earlier years of the Ionian war, and, that other factors than the Sicilian defeat contributed to Athens' eventual defeat.

A good answer will include consideration of:

- The loss of men and commanders, and the defection of Alcibiades, as a result of Sicily gave Athens a number of challenges to face.
- Athens' underestimation of Sparta and overconfidence in her fleet had undone the commanders in Sicily. They would have done well to avoid making the same mistake again.
- The Athenian navy, the cornerstone of her power, had been destroyed. The 1000 talents that Pericles had set aside for emergencies was utilized so that by 412, Athens had recovered to 150 triremes. This recovery is remarkable.
- Athenian garrisons in the Peloponnese were withdrawn to protect Athens and the Piraeus, allowing Sparta time to consolidate her land domination.
- Alcibiades, who had deserted the Athenian cause during the Sicilian expedition, gave the Spartans advice to occupy Decelaea (this caused the desertion of around 20,000 slaves and a halt to silver mining). Thucydides 7.27 'Indeed the occupation of Decelea, resulting as it did in so much devastation of property and loss of manpower, was one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power.'
- The Expedition caused much divisiveness within Athens, leading to the abolition of the Boule and the appointment of Ten Commissioners to guide the state. The overthrow of the Democracy and its replacement by an Oligarchy in the period 411–410 BC speaks strongly to the feeling in Athens that the democracy had failed the polis in Sicily (and the War so far, more broadly).
- The disaster in Sicily gave an opportunity to the Persian satraps in Ionia (Tissaphernes in Lydia and Pharnabazus in Phrygia) to regain lost Greek territory. They entered into alliances with Sparta which inspired many island states, notably Miletus, Lesbos and Chios to revolt; the intervention of Persia ultimately led to the funding of a Spartan navy which was crucial to Athens' demise.
- While Sicily was devastating for Athens, she did rally. Examples include the successes of the Hellespont fleet from 410–408 and Alcibiades' successes until Notium.
- Similarly, Athens made other subsequent mistakes, including the execution of the Generals after Arginusae, and exiling Alcibiades, thus the Sicilian campaign was not Athens' only error.

## Question 28

(25 marks)

Analyse the reasons for the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War 431–404 BC.

Candidates should avoid a recount of the events of the Peloponnesian War in answer to this question.

Candidates may choose to approach the question by focusing on the reasons given in the ancient sources for Athens' defeat, and/or, may construct a answer using evidence from the narrative.

There is a great deal of information in the ancient and modern sources for the period, therefore, any good answer will construct a successful argument by choosing evidence wisely from the extensive narrative (i.e. by analysing which events and/or individuals and/or ideas made a critical contribution to Athens' defeat).

Some candidates might evaluate the merit of the strategy of both sides at the outset of and during the war, though this should not form the bulk of a answer to this question, which requires wider consideration of the factors leading to Athens' final defeat.

- According to Thucydides, Pericles' death in 429 BC led to Athens' defeat. When Pericles was 'at the head of affairs the state was wisely led and firmly guarded, and it was under him that Athens was at her greatest' 2.65. Therefore, Thucydides holds Pericles' successors to account, stating that it was they who damaged the city's war-effort. Thucydides highlights the role of Alcibiades as a demagogue in convincing the Athenians to undertake the expedition to Sicily for personal gain, though largely avoids holding him responsible for its failure. The contribution of other demagogues (Cleon, Demosthenes, Cleophon, etc) may be discussed, additionally the conservative Nicias makes a good example.
- Furthermore, Thucydides argued that the demos at home played a role in the Athenian defeat. In particular uses the Sicilian expedition to argue that the Athenians at home did not provide adequate support to those in the field.
- However, even after the defeat in Sicily, Athens managed to hold out against an overwhelming coalition of opposing forces, until internal dissensions brought it down; in other words, the city defeated itself. Hence, the internal discord within Athens, including the Oligarchic Revolt of 411-10, played a role in the defeat of Athens. Nonetheless, this internal discord was evident during the earlier parts of the war (i.e. the Melian dialogue, the debate in the assembly over the Pylos campaign, etc), and is particularly evident during the divisive debate in the Athenian Assembly about the General's actions after the Battle of Arginusae in 406 BC which resulted in the execution of six Generals. Other examples might be offered.
- Spartan actions during the period might be considered, and, may feature more significantly in a stronger answer. Candidates might relate the effectiveness of changes to Spartan strategy throughout the period, including the campaigns of Brasidas, the occupation of Decelaea, the alliance with Persia, the campaigns of Lysander for control of the Hellespont, among others.
- Candidates should be able to point out the successes of Athens in the period – numerous decisive Athenian victories in battle resulted in Sparta seeking peace several times. Discussion over whether or not Athens rejection of these offers led to its defeat is valid. The Peace of Nicias was partially a result of Athenian military and political power at the time. Other examples might be offered.
- Xenophon's narrative places considerable emphasis on the role of Persia's intervention in the defeat of Athens' navy, Xen 1.5.7. After Cyrus' meeting with Lysander in 407 BC

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and in the performance of their navy. The successful association of Sparta with Persia was probably the key to their victory. Things may have gone very differently had Athens been able to access Persian resources, as Alcibiades and the Oligarchs had planned. Good answers will consider the extent of the impact of Persia at this time.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- Question 16** Dot points 2 (up to ‘...Saronic Gulf’), 4 & 11 adapted from: Battle of Thermopylae. (2021). In *Wikipedia*. Retrieved August, 2021, from <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki?curid=157446>  
Used under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported licence
- Question 17** Information from: Plutarch. (1960). *The rise and fall of Athens: Nine Greek lives* (Aristides 22-25) (I. Scott-Kilvert, Trans.). Penguin Books, pp. 133–136. (Plutarch c. AD 46–c. 120).  
Quotes from: Plutarch. (1960). *The rise and fall of Athens: Nine Greek lives* (Aristides 23) (I. Scott-Kilvert, Trans.). Penguin Books, pp. 134–135. (Plutarch c. AD 46–c. 120).  
Dot point 8 quote from: Plutarch. (1960). *The rise and fall of Athens: Nine Greek lives* (Aristides 25) (I. Scott-Kilvert, Trans.). Penguin Books, p. 136. (Plutarch c. AD 46–c. 120).
- Question 19** Pericles’ warning from: Thucydides. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War* (2.63) (R. Warner, Trans.). Penguin. (Thucydides c. 460-c. 395 BC)
- Question 20** Information from: Boardman, J., Lewis, D. M., Davies, J. K., & Ostwald, M. (Eds.). (1992). *The Cambridge ancient history: Vol. 5. The fifth century BC* (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, pp. 414 & 416.  
Information from: Powell, A. (2001). *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek political and social history from 478 BC*. Routledge, pp. 123, 129 & 168,  
Information from: Rhodes, P. J. (2001). *Athenian democracy*. Oxford University Press, pp. 111, 116–117 & 120  
Dot point 11 under ‘the argument the Sparta was negatively affected’ adapted from: Powell, A. (2001). *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek political and social history from 478 BC*. Routledge, p. 174.  
Dot points 2 (sentence 1), 6 (sentence 1) 7 (sentence 1) under ‘the argument the Sparta was not affected’ adapted from: Rhodes, P. J. (2001). *Athenian democracy*. Oxford University Press, p. 117.
- Question 22** Information from: Kagan, D. (2005) *The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in savage conflict, 431-404 BC*. Harper Perennial, pp. 57–61.  
Dot point 5 information from: Ober, J. (2009). *Thucydides on Athens’ democratic advantage in the Archidamian War* (p. 6). Retrieved November, 2021, from <http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/ober/080902.pdf>
- Question 23** Information from: Buckley, T. (2010). *Aspects of Greek history 750-323 BC: A source-based approach* (2nd Ed.). Routledge, pp. 243, 245–248 & 250–251.
- Question 24** Information from: Powell, A. (2001). *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek political and social history from 478 BC*. Routledge, pp. 9–10 & 104–6.  
Information from: Rhodes, P. J. (2001). *Athenian democracy*. Oxford University Press, pp. 30–31.

- Question 26** Information from: Powell, A. (2001). *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek political and social history from 478 BC*. Routledge, p. 122.  
Dot point 8 ('It was he who...' to '...influence over people') adapted from: Thucydides. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War* (3.36) (R. Warner, Trans.). Penguin. (Thucydides c. 460-c. 395 BC)  
Dot point 13: Thucydides. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War* (R. Warner, Trans.). Penguin. (Thucydides c. 460-c. 395 BC)
- Question 27** Dot point 5 quote from: Thucydides. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War* (7.27) (R. Warner, Trans.). Penguin. (Thucydides c. 460-c. 395 BC)
- Question 28** Dot point 1 quote from: Thucydides. (1972). *History of the Peloponnesian War* (2.65) (R. Warner, Trans.). Penguin. (Thucydides c. 460-c. 395 BC)  
Dot points 2 ('Athenians at home...') to 3 ('...city defeated itself.') adapted from: Heath, M. (1990) *Thucydides' political judgement*. Liverpool Classical Monthly, 15. p. 2.

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