

PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

ATAR course examination 2021

Marking key

Marking keys are an explicit statement about what the examining panel expect of candidates when they respond to particular examination items. They help ensure a consistent interpretation of the criteria that guide the awarding of marks.

Question 1

Are the following statements analytic or synthetic?

(a) If something is a colourless, clear, drinkable fluid, then it is spring water. (1 mark)

Description	Marks
synthetic	1
Total	1

(b) Spring water is a colourless, clear, drinkable fluid.

Description		Marks
analytic		1
	Total	1

Question 2

(a) You can enter Western Australia only if you have a permanent address here.

Underline the **two** sentences that mean the same as the above sentence. (2 marks)

(i) If you have a permanent address in Western Australia then you can enter.

(ii) If you can enter Western Australia then you have a permanent address here.

- (iii) If you don't have a permanent address in Western Australia, then you can't enter.
- (iv) Having a permanent address in Western Australia is a sufficient condition for entering Western Australia.

Description		Marks
Sentence (ii) is underlined (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way).		1
Sentence (iii) is underlined (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way).		1
	Total	2

(b) Express the following sentence as a conditional (If X then Y) statement. (1 mark)

Either the hose has not been fitted correctly or the tap is leaking.

Description		Marks
If the hose has been fitted correctly then the tap is leaking		
or		1
If the tap is not leaking then the hose has not been fitted correctly.		
	Total	1

30% (30 Marks)

(2 marks)


(1 mark)

(4 marks)

- (c) (i) You will not be allowed to enter this nightclub unless you are aged 18 or over.
 - (ii) Being aged 18 or over is sufficient for being allowed entry to this nightclub.

Do sentences (i) and (ii) mean the same thing? Circle the correct answer. (1 mark)

Yes



Description	Marks
The word No, and nothing else, is circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way)	1
Total	1

MARKING KEY

Question 3

(1) {To be truly racist is to wrongly believe that science has shown us beyond doubt that there are biologically distinct races of humans, some of which are more advanced than others.} Thankfully, (2) {in Australia, our legal, political and economic institutions can no longer be said to endorse or embody such beliefs.} It follows that (3) {our legal, political and economic institutions can no longer be said to be racist in any way whatsoever.}

For the above argument:

(a) circle any inference indicators

Description	Marks
'It follows that' is circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way) as shown above. Nothing more is circled. Nothing less is circled.	1
Total	1

(b) bracket and number the separable statements

DescriptionMarksBrackets and numbers are placed in the exact locations as shown above.
Candidates who include the word 'Thankfully' in the second set of brackets1may receive the mark.Total1

(c) using the numbers from part (b), draw a diagram of the argument

	Description		Marks	
(1)	+ ↓ (3)	(2)		1
			Total	1

(d) evaluate the cogency of the argument. Circle the correct answer (1 mark)

 Cogent
 Not cogent

 Description
 Marks

 The words 'Not Cogent' are circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way). Nothing else is circled.
 1

 Total
 1

(1 mark)

(1 mark)

(1 mark)

(5 marks)

4

(e) give **one** reason for your answer to part (d).

(1 mark)

Description	Marks
 The following are possible answers why the above argument may be considered Not cogent. The list is not exhaustive. In cases where the candidate provides an answer not listed below, markers must use their judgement to decide if the candidate provided a sufficient reason. Since an argument may be deemed Not cogent because of (i) unacceptable premises or (ii) insufficient support that premises give to the conclusion or (iii) fallacious reasoning or (iv) a combination of the above, students may provide a reason that targets any of these criteria. Definist fallacy. Our institutions may still 'embody' such beliefs, even if not explicitly. There may be other ways in which our institutions can be said to be racist. 	1
Total	1

Question 4

(2 marks)

(a) Name the fallacy committed in the following argument (1 mark)

The government is encouraging its citizens to give their children the new measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) immunisation 'for the good of society'. If we let them get away with that, they'll be injecting us with all kinds of experimental drugs for the common good.

Description		Marks
Slippery slope or slippery precedent or adverse consequences.		1
	Total	1

(b) Name the fallacy committed in the following argument

(1 mark)

Students at the University of Cambridge get the best education, at one of the oldest universities in the world. So, you can't get a better education than at the University of Cambridge.

Description	Marks
Begging the question or circular argument	1
Total	1

Question 5

For the following argument:

A higher percentage of people with serious mental health issues, than those without them, report having problems with their sleep. It's easy to see that the reason these people are having issues with their mental health is simply that they aren't getting enough sleep.

(a) underline the conclusion

Description	Marks
The conclusion is underlined (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way) as shown above. Nothing else is underlined.	1
Total	1

(b) name the fallacy committed.

> Description Marks confusion of correlation and causation or cum hoc ergo propter hoc 1 1 Total

Question 6

For the following argument:

Since an incremental increase in the minimum wage was last legislated, there has been a dramatic increase in the unemployment rate Clearly then, aising the minimum wage incrementally caused unemployment to rise significantly

(a) circle any inference indicators

> Description Marks 'Clearly then' is circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous 1 way) as shown above. Nothing more is circled. Nothing less is circled. Total 1

(b) evaluate the cogency. Circle the correct answer (1 mark)

Cogent

Description

Marks The words 'Not cogent' are circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive 1 or unambiguous way). Nothing else is circled. Total 1

(c) give **one** reason for your answer to part (b).

Description	Marks
<i>Post hoc ergo propter hoc</i> or post hoc fallacy After the fact therefore because of the fact.	1
Total	1

Not cogent

(2 marks)

(1 mark)

(1 mark)

(3 marks)

(1 mark)

(1 mark)

Question 7

(3 marks)

Construct a deductively valid argument that uses all the following statements only once. Use a diagram to represent the argument you construct.

- (1) If a moral theory proposes several standards by which to judge the moral worth of our actions, then the theory cannot decide between conflicting moral judgments.
- (2) If a moral theory allows that the same course of action could be judged good by one standard and judged bad by another standard, then the theory cannot decide between conflicting moral judgments.
- (3) Moral relativism allows for a variety of standards for judging the moral worth of our actions.
- (4) If a moral theory proposes several standards by which to judge the moral worth of our actions, then the theory would allow the same course of action to be judged good by one standard and judged bad by another standard.

Description		Marks
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		1–3
1 mark for showing (4) linked with (2) to support sub-conclusion (1) 1 mark for showing (1) linked with (3) 1 mark for showing (5) as the main conclusion		
	Total	3

(5) Moral relativism cannot decide between conflicting moral judgments.

(3 marks)

Question 8

(1) {When engaging in serious debates such as whether God or freewill exist, it is important for each side of the debate to be as explicit as possible on their definitions of these key terms.} (2) {Unless this occurs, the two sides will talk at cross-purposes} and (3) {if they talk at cross purposes, the debate will not progress.} Indeed, (4) {a lack of clarity on key terms must be the reason for philosophy's lack of progress in any of these serious debates.}

For the above argument:

(a) bracket and number the separable statements

(1 mark)

Description	Marks
Brackets and numbers are placed in the exact locations as shown above.	1
Total	1

(b) write out the separable statements in full.

(2 marks)

Description	Marks
(1) When engaging in serious debates such as whether God or freewill	
exist, it is important for each side of the debate to be as explicit as	
possible on their definitions of the key terms.	1
(2) Unless [each side (of the debate) is explicit as possible on their	
definitions of the key terms], the two sides will talk at cross purposes.	
(3) If [the two sides (of the debate)] talk at cross purposes, the debate	
will not progress.	
(4) A lack of clarity on key terms must be (or 'is') the reason for	
philosophy's lack of progress on any of these serious debates.	1
*the words 'of the debate' may be excluded or included.	
Total	2

PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

Question 9

(6 marks)

(1) {Human infants have a right to life only if animals with comparable cognitive capacities also have that same right to life.) From this we can infer that 2) (if animals with cognitive capacities comparable to human infants don't have a right to life then neither do human infants.} But (3) {animals do have such rights.} (So, it follows that (4) {human infants must have a right to life too.}

9

For the above argument:

(a) bracket and number the separable statements (1 mark)

Description	
Brackets and numbers are placed in the exact locations as shown above.	1
Total	1

(b) circle any inference indicators

Description	Marks
'From this we can infer that', or 'We can infer that' is circled. 'So it follows that' is circled. (Circled or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way as shown above.) Nothing else is circled.	1
Total	1

using the numbers from part (a), draw a diagram of the argument (c)


(2 marks) Description Marks (1) (2)(3) 1–2 (4)1 mark for (1) supporting sub-conclusion (2) 1 mark for (2) and (3) linked to support the main conclusion (4) or (1) (3) 1–2 (4) 1 mark for showing (1) and (3) linked 1 mark showing (4) as the conclusion Showing (4) as the conclusion 1 Total 2

(1 mark)

Question 9 (continued)

(d) evaluate the overall inferential strength of the argument. Circle the correct answer

(1 mark)



Moderate

Strong

Description		Marks
The word Weak is circled (or otherwise indicated in a distinctive or unambiguous way). Nothing else is circled.		1
	Total	1

(e) give **one** reason for your evaluation in part (d).

(1 mark)

Description	Marks
The inference from (2) and (3) to (4) is an example of the fallacy denying the antecedent or is a (logical) non-sequitur	
or	1
The inference from (1) and (3) to (4) is an example of the fallacy affirming the consequent or is a (logical) non-sequitur.	
Total	1

PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

Total

20

Section Two: Philosophical analysis and evaluation	40% (40 Marks)	
Part A	20% (20 Marks)	
Question 10	(20 marks)	
The following dialogue is an excerpt from a community of inquiry.		
 You are required to: summarise the contributions of each participant clarify these contributions evaluate them critically. 	(2 marks) (6 marks) (12 marks)	

Description	Marks
Criterion 1: Summary of the contributions of each participant	
Summarises accurately and succinctly the contributions of each participant.	2
Summarises accurately the contribution of only one participant.	1
Subtotal	2
Criterion 2: Clarification of the contributions	
Clarifies the contributions of both participants succinctly and accurately by	
explaining their arguments, using relevant examples where appropriate. A clear	6
and accurate understanding of the philosophical concepts at issue in the	0
dialogue is demonstrated throughout.	
Provides clarification of the contributions of both participants, but at times lacks	
in brevity and accuracy. Some demonstration that philosophical concepts at	4–5
issue in the dialogue are accurately understood.	
Makes some relevant claims about the contributions of the participants but	
merely describes rather than clarifies the arguments. Some errors in	2–3
comprehending the philosophical concepts at issue in the dialogue.	
Limited clarification of the contributions of either participant.	1
Subtotal	6
Criterion 3: Critical evaluation	
Provides a targeted and coherent critical evaluation of the contributions of each	
participant in the context of a dialogue, giving clear reasons for the stated	
evaluation of premise acceptability, inferential strength and overall cogency,	11–12
correctly referring to fallacies and examples/counter examples where	
necessary, and accurately using the appropriate disciplinary terminology.	
Provides a critical evaluation of the contributions of each participant in the	
context of a dialogue, giving some reasons for the stated evaluation of premise	
acceptability, inferential strength and overall cogency, identifying some	9–10
fallacies examples/counter examples where necessary, and using the	
appropriate disciplinary terminology.	
Some evidence of critical evaluation of the contributions of each participant,	
with stated reasons for premise acceptability, inferential strength and overall	
cogency. May not mention fallacies where relevant. Some inaccuracies using	7–8
the appropriate disciplinary terminology.	
Some evaluation of the contributions of each participant, with assertions about	
premise acceptability, inferential strength or overall cogency. May not mention	
fallacies where relevant. Disciplinary terminology used inaccurately or	5–6
participant contributions not evaluated in their dialogic context.	
Makes assertions about the cogency of the arguments presented by the	
participants. Disciplinary terminology used inaccurately and participant contributions not evaluated in their dialogic context.	3–4
Limited critical evaluation of the contributions.	1–2
Subtotal	12

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Question 10 (continued)

Note: The following notes for Question 10 are not exhaustive and are to be used as a guide to judgement according to the marking key. Candidates are not required to make all of the following points to achieve full marks.

Analysis and evaluation

Analysis and evaluation

The dialogue concerns the ethics of veganism, in particular, whether the farming industry is morally justified. Jake argues against veganism, insisting that our Aussie lifestyle and the economy depend upon animal consumption. Leah defends veganism, likening the farming industry to the slavery and murder of humans.

Jake begins by berating the vegan activists for storming the restaurant 'Only meat' and heckling the diners. He argues that if everyone were to become vegan, then our Aussie lifestyle would be in jeopardy as we would have to replace our beloved barbeque with a diet of lettuce & suchlike and the economy would collapse. Whilst he probably isn't being literal about the diet of lettuce, Jake's claim here does reflect an outdated view that the vegan diet is very boring & restrictive with no barbeque options and that it would add little of economic value. The errors in reasoning here can be interpreted in different ways. On one reading, Jake commits a fallacy of <u>false dichotomy</u> by presupposing that the only two options are (a) rely on animal products, and have a sustained economy and (b) have a very restrictive barbeque-free vegan diet and suffer economic ruin. On another reading, the parody of the vegan diet is merely a slur and not central to the argument. Instead, Jake objects to veganism using (i) a <u>fallacious appeal to tradition</u> (eating meat at a barbeque is the Aussie way), and (ii) <u>a slippery slope argument</u> (prohibitions on meat eating would lead to an economic slump).

Leah's reply correctly points out other feasible options should everyone become vegan – the vegan food industry has long since moved on from lettuce, and the production of tasty meat substitutes may well save the economy from ruin should it become the norm. She then draws an <u>analogy</u> between the meat and dairy industry on one hand and the murder and enslavement of human beings on the other. She argues that if we think that human murder and slavery are morally wrong, and that attempts to justify slavery on economic grounds are repugnant, then we ought to think that an economic justification of farming animals for human consumption is equally repugnant, and the practice itself every bit as bad. Her <u>analogy here is faulty</u>, as she overlooks relevant differences between humans and farm animals, such as cognitive capacity, their place in human relations, and so on. She also uses <u>strong slanting in language with emotive words</u> to flatten any perceived moral difference between treatment of humans and animals (e.g. 'murder, slavery' 'human animals' 'non-human brethren') with the intent to have us think, <u>question-beggingly</u>, that farming is as wrong as human slavery & murder.

Jake replies by claiming that it follows from Leah's reasoning that treading on ants and killing insects is tantamount to murder, which would make all food production ethically problematic. The thought is that, because Leah's view leads to this absurd conclusion, it cannot possibly be correct. However, Jake's claim here misrepresents Leah's position and he thereby commits a <u>strawman fallacy</u>. Whilst Leah hasn't given compelling grounds for thinking that the killing of animals is morally equivalent to the killing of humans, it is uncharitable to interpret her as also claiming that the killing of insects would be morally equivalent to the killing of humans.

Leah responds by denying that she ever said that treading on ants is murder. She backs this up by drawing a <u>disanalogy</u> between ants and farm animals, arguing that ants, even if conscious, live less satisfying lives than farm animals, making it worse to kill farm animals than ants. But while this reply has some merit, it simultaneously undermines her earlier argument (that tried to morally equate the treatment of humans with that of farm animals). For it would imply that as humans have the capacity to live more satisfying lives than farm animals, it is worse to kill and enslave humans than to farm non-human animals.

N	MARKING KEY 13 PHILOSOPHY AND ETHIC		AND ETHICS		
Part B 20%				% (20 Marks)	
C	Question 11				
•	 Choose one of the following passages and: summarise the passage clarify its argument evaluate it critically. 			(2 marks) (8 marks) (10 marks)	
	Description				
	Criterion 1: Summary of the passage	е			
	Summarises the passage accurately a	nd succinctly.		2	
	Summarises the passage only partially	or with only part	tial accuracy.	1	
			Subtotal	2	
	Criterion 2: Clarification of the argui	ment of the pas	sage		
	Clarifies the argument of the passage s its inferential structure, correctly identif rationales (sub-arguments, premises, o Demonstrated proficiency with philosop	fying its main cor or examples) adv	nclusion and the vanced in support.	8	
	Provides clarification of the argument of structure, identifying its main conclusion support, but at times lacks in brevity ar proficiency with philosophical concepts	of the passage and on and the rationand accuracy. Son as at issue in the p	nd its inferential ales advanced in ne evidence of passage.	6–7	
	Provides clarification of the argument of				

structure, but at times lacks in brevity and accuracy. May demonstrate some

Makes some relevant claims about the argument of the passage but merely describes rather than clarifies the inferential structure and philosophical

misunderstandings of the argument structure and/ or the philosophical

concepts at issue in the passage.

concepts.

Limited clarification of the argument of the passage.	1	
Subtotal	8	
Criterion 3: Critical evaluation of the passage		
Provides a targeted and coherent critical evaluation of the passage giving clear reasons for the stated evaluation of premise acceptability, inferential strength and overall cogency. Where relevant, fallacies are correctly identified, theoretical positions are clarified, counter arguments are elaborated and the disciplinary terminology is used appropriately.	9–10	
Provides a critical evaluation of the passage giving some reasons for the stated evaluation of premise acceptability, inferential strength and overall cogency. Some evidence of having identified fallacies, clarified theoretical positions and elaborated counter arguments where relevant, with appropriate use of the disciplinary terminology.	7–8	
Some evidence of critical evaluation of the passage with stated reasons for premise acceptability, inferential strength and overall cogency. May not mention fallacies or counter arguments where relevant. Some inaccuracies using the appropriate disciplinary terminology or in demonstrated understandings of the relevant theoretical viewpoints.	5–6	
Some evaluation of the passage, with assertions about premise acceptability, inferential strength or overall cogency. May not mention fallacies or counter arguments where relevant. Disciplinary terminology used inaccurately.	3–4	
Makes assertions about the cogency of the argument in the passage. No mention of fallacies or counter arguments where relevant.	1–2	
Subtotal	10	
Total	20	

4–5

2–3

Question 11 (continued)

Note: The following model answers and notes for Passages One, Two and Three are not exhaustive and are to be used as a guide to judgement according to the marking key. Candidates are not required to make all of the following points to achieve full marks.

Passage One

The passage presents an argument for the claim that Utilitarianism is an implausible moral theory. Two examples are offered in support of that position. The first claims that implications of the theory regarding our practices of blaming and holding other persons morally responsible for their actions would be unreasonable. The second claims that implications of the theory concerning practical deliberation would be unreasonable.

According to the first example, Utilitarianism implies that a person acts immorally and should be blamed for their actions whenever they choose some seemingly benign course of action – such as going to sleep – rather than some other action that might better contribute to the greater good. But the theory need not be thought of as having this implication.

Broadly speaking, utilitarianism directs moral agents to act in such a way so as to bring about the greatest good for the greatest number. We should concede that there may be some specific occasions, such as those involving emergencies, where it is true that we ought to help other persons rather than go to sleep, and where those who refuse to help would be morally blameworthy. But this will not always be the case. For one thing, if we never chose to get any sleep ourselves, we would likely become incapacitated and would no longer be able to act for anyone's benefit, emergency or not.

More importantly, proponents of Utilitarianism can draw a distinction between the wrongness of an action and its blameworthiness. By doing so, Utilitarians can easily accommodate the thought that it would be unreasonable to blame persons for choosing to sleep rather than act altruistically in non-emergency situations, even if there is some other possible thing they could do which would actually bring about more good. Blaming people in each and every circumstance where they do not perform the action that would bring about the best circumstances may discourage people from trying. Such an excessive practice of blaming is unlikely to bring about the most good overall. In this way, our practices of blaming persons become an object for consideration under the theory of Utilitarianism.

The second example claims that because of the fact that on the Utilitarian view the rightness or wrongness of our actions is determined by the consequences of those actions, it is too hard for moral agents to work out what the right thing to do actually is in any given circumstance when thinking about how they should act. One response to this criticism is to distinguish between (i) a criterion of right and wrong, and (ii) a decision procedure. Whilst Utilitarianism clearly presents a theory of what it is that makes some act right or wrong, no single approach to thinking about what one should do follows directly from that theory. At least, not without some further consideration of consequences.

Precisely because of uncertainty regarding the consequences of our actions and the limitations on our capacity to foresee such consequences, it may be that in order to bring about the most good, moral agents ought to deliberate in light of standards and principles other than directly considering the consequences of their actions. But this doesn't demonstrate that Utilitarianism's criterion of right and wrong is implausible. It simply shows that any answer to the question of how people should deliberate about what to do is itself something that needs to be evaluated in terms of the consequences it brings about.

*Another response is to note that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on whether the consequences are to be understood subjectively or objectively. If understood objectively, as assumed by the second example, then we are often not in a position to know whether our act will be right or wrong. But if understood subjectively, then the rightness or wrongness of an act will depend on what evidence we have available to us as subjects. If we act to maximise what we reasonably *expect* will be the best consequences, then even if things don't turn out as expected, we will still have done the right thing. This makes Utilitarianism less implausible.

Passage Two

The passage concerns the problem of evil, a well-known argument against belief in the existence of a God who is all good, all knowing, and all powerful. According to the argument, the existence of such a God is not compatible with the fact that there is evil and suffering in the world. The passage presents a reply to that argument which aims to show that there is no such incompatibility.

The reply is centred on five major claims.

- 1. Free human action is the cause of much of the evil and suffering in the world.
- 2. If free human action is permitted, some amount of evil and suffering will exist.
- 3. The value of free human action exceeds the disvalue of the evil and suffering caused by free human action.
- 4. A world with free human action is more valuable than a world without free human action.
- 5. God's goodness constrains him to create a world with the most good in it.

On the basis of these five claims taken together, the author infers a sub-conclusion which asserts that,

SC1. In order to create a world with the most good in it God had to create a world that realised the goodness of free human action and which thereby contains some amount of evil and suffering.

The conclusion then follows that,

C. The existence of God is compatible with the existence of evil and suffering.

One major shortcoming of the reply is its exclusive focus on accounting for what might be called 'moral' evil. That is, evil which is the result of the actions of moral agents. In doing so, the reply provides no accounting for the existence of so-called 'natural evil,' which includes bushfires and other natural disasters that are the source of much suffering. Strictly then, the reply is only entitled to the conclusion that God's existence is compatible with 'moral' evil, not all evil and suffering. With that modification, the inference to the conclusion would be strong.

However, the reply also suffers from problems with the acceptability of its premises. Claims (2), (3), and (4) are very controversial and little to no argument is offered in their defence.

Regarding (2), it is far from obvious that evil and suffering are a necessary consequence of allowing for free human action. But even if that claim is accepted, there remains the question of how much evil and suffering is necessary given some amount of free human action. The world is full of crimes against morality and the innocent, and much of it seems totally redundant, avoidable and senseless. Much more is needed in order to demonstrate the 'necessity' of all of that evil and suffering which is caused by moral agents.

As for claims (3) and (4), they are pure assertion. Whilst it can be agreed that free human action is valuable, whether or not that value is so exceptional that it outweighs the evil and suffering that is its necessary consequence, or that any world in which it is not realised is a world of lesser value are open questions. Once again, the amount of evil and suffering we know to be present in the world tells against any acceptance of these claims without further argument. If a little less human freedom results in a world with a little less evil and suffering, it is not obvious that that world is straightforwardly less valuable, let alone that it could not possibly be more valuable.

Given the fact that the reply rests on such contentious claims which are not themselves argued for, the passage might instead be read as having offered a conditional argument which aims only to provide a possible explanation of evil and suffering which is compatible with God's existence. On this reading, the author of the passage is only asking for provisional acceptance of claims (2), (3) and (4) for the sake of argument. If read in this way, the argument of the passage would be more cogent, and might suffice for refutation of the 'logical' form of the argument from evil. But the same problems I have identified about the acceptability of these claims would return as problems for the plausibility of this possible way for God's existence to be thought of as compatible with the existence of moral evil.

Passage Three

Summary:

Passage three gives an argument about inductive reasoning. The passage claims that while we cannot do without inductive reasoning in our day-to-day life it is a way of reasoning that lacks a proper rational foundation.

Clarification:

The conclusion of the passage is the first sentence, that is, inductive reasoning is both essential to our survival and utterly unfounded. Because the conclusion makes two separate claims – the first about the necessity of induction to our survival and the second about its rational foundation – the argument has a convergent structure. The argument might be standardised in the following way:

(P1) We use inductive reasoning all day, every day and we wouldn't be able to function without it. (premise)

(P2) Induction is the very foundation of our basic belief that the kinds of experiences we have today will resemble the kinds of experiences we had in the past. (premise)

(SC1) Without induction there could be no concept of learning by experience. (from P2)

(SC2) Inductive reasoning is essential to our survival. (from P1 and SC1, convergent)

(P3) All of the inferences we make which are based on our previous experiences rely on the assumption that the future will resemble the past, or that the relationships between cause and effect that we have observed in the past, will continue to hold into the future. (premise)


(P4) The only basis for the assumptions that the future will resemble the past, or that the relationships between cause and effect that we have observed in the past, will continue to hold into the future is a belief in the uniformity of nature. (premise)

(P5) We can always entertain the possibility that the course of nature might change, and that the future will not in fact resemble the past. (premise)

(SC3) We have no proper rational basis for our confidence in induction. (P3, P4 and P5, linked)

(C) Inductive reasoning is both essential to our basic survival and utterly unfounded. (from SC2 and SC3, convergent)

A diagram is not required but may be used by candidates to understand the structure. A diagram of the argument might look like this.



Evaluation:

Evaluation of the argument should focus on

- (i) the support the premises give to the conclusion and the sub-conclusions
- (ii) the acceptability of the premises

The acceptability of P5 might be supported further by Hume's considerations that there is no contradiction in the future not resembling the past, and that we cannot empirically observe any such necessity that could underpin the resemblance between future and past.

Candidates might point out that the inferences from P1 to SC2 and from P2 to SC1 are almost question begging.

The inference from P3, P4 and P5 to SC3 might be challenged by a number of strategies that can be taken to counter Hume's scepticism about induction—whichever candidates may have learnt on the curriculum. For example, one such strategy is that of saying that the future will *probably* resemble the past. (There are answers, of course, to this too, if a candidate wants to focus on probabilism strategy).

It seems harder to challenge the idea that we need induction to survive. Depending on what candidates have learnt, a response might mention Popper's view that we don't in fact reason inductively but jump to conclusions and then reason deductively will be relevant.

Section Three: Construction of argument

Marks will be awarded for demonstration of:

- philosophical understandings
- philosophical argument
- clarity and structure.

The marking key below applies to Questions 12 to 16.

Description	Marks		
Criterion 1: Philosophical understandings			
Demonstrates a critical understanding of philosophical topics relevant to the question and uses sophisticated philosophical language and concepts.	9–10		
Demonstrates understanding of philosophical topics relevant to the question and uses appropriate language and concepts.	7–8		
Demonstrates an understanding of philosophical topics relevant to the question and uses some appropriate philosophical language and concepts.	5–6		
Demonstrates some understanding of philosophical topics relevant to the question.	3–4		
Demonstrates a limited understanding of philosophical topics relevant to the question.	1–2		
Subtotal	10		
Criterion 2: Philosophical arguments			
Constructs a relevant, cogent argument, which demonstrates originality, and a deep understanding of philosophical method (e.g. relies on plausible assumptions, demonstrates logical insight, effectively uses examples and counter-examples where appropriate).	14–15		
Constructs a relevant, cogent argument, which demonstrates a sound understanding of philosophical method.	12–13		
Constructs a relevant, moderately cogent argument, which demonstrates some understanding of philosophical method.	10–11		
Constructs a relevant, moderately cogent argument (e.g. may contain some errors in reasoning or fails to consider possible objections where appropriate).	8–9		
Constructs a relevant, weak argument (e.g. may make controversial assumptions, beg the question and/or commit some other serious errors of reasoning such as informal or formal fallacies)	6–7		
Constructs a weak argument that makes few relevant claims (e.g. commits several serious errors of reasoning, has tenuous/occasional links with the question).	4–5		
Makes some claims relevant to the question but fails to construct any argument (e.g. merely makes assertions, merely discusses the thoughts of others).	2–3		
Limited relevant argument (e.g. fails to address the question).	1		
Subtotal	15		
Criterion 3: Clarity and structure			
Writes with structure and clarity (e.g. clarifies key terms, sign-post key steps of the argument, logical ordering of topics).	4–5		
Writes with some structure and some clarity.	2–3		
Limited structure and clarity (e.g. fails to clarify key terms, unclear argument structure).	1		
Subtotal			
Total	30		

30% (30 Marks)

(10 marks) (15 marks)

(5 marks)

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